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LOAN AGREEMENT: A SETTLEMENT DEVICE
THAT DESERVES CLOSE SCRUTINY
JOHN E. MCKAY*
INTRODUCTION
The validity of so-called loan receipt agreements' is examined
in this article. Historically, the loan receipt agreement has its
origin between an insurer and its insured-shipper.2 For instance,
Ray is insured by the Safety Insurance Company on all shipments
of sugar cane made in the course of Ray's commercial enterprise.
Tarry Shippers is in the business of shipping cargoes of sugar
cane. Unfortunately, Tarry Shippers loses the sugar cane which
was shipped by Ray. In order to fulfill its contractual obligation
to indemnify, Safety Insurance Company enters into a loan re-
ceipt agreement with Ray. The agreement provides the following:
(1) The amount turned over to Ray, the insured, is received as
a loan. (2) It is repayable only in the event and to the extent
of a recovery by the insured from Tarry Shippers or other third
persons on account of the loss described therein. (3) The insured's
claim against third persons who may be liable for the loss is
pledged as security for such repayment. (4) Ray, the insured,
shall institute an action in his own name against Tarry Shippers
and such third persons or appoint the insurer, Safety Insurance
Company, his attorney, with irrevocable power to prosecute or
settle such an action in the insured's name and to execute any
documents necessary to effectuate the agreement. In any event,
the action against Tarry Shippers is to be under the insurer's ex-
clusive control, direction, and expense. (5) Ray, the insured, war-
rants that he is the person entitled to the payment and that he
has not and will not settle with or release Tarry Shippers or any-
one responsible for the loss without the consent of the insurer,
Safety Insurance Company.' This example sets forth the typical
situation from which these agreements arose and upon which they
have been held valid.
*B.A. DePauw University, 1973; J.D. Candidate Valparaiso University,
1976. Articles Editor, Valparaiso University Law Review.
1. See generally Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S.
139 (1918); Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 602 (1975); Annot., 62 A.L.R.Bd 1111
(1973); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 42 (1967).
2. See Section I. ORIGIN OF THE SO-CALLED LOAN RECEIPT AGREEMENT
infra.
3. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 42 (1967).
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Specifically, this article concedes that so-called loan receipt
agreements are valid in their traditional factual setting. Nonethe-
less, a device proper in one situation is not necessarily valid in all
situations. This article attacks the validity of these contrivances
in a factual context not comprehended by the insurers who origi-
nally won court approval for them. Nowadays, such devices are
widely used in the plaintiff-codefendant context. For example,
assume that Adam is the victim of a car accident allegedly caused
by Bob and Charles. Adam institutes a negligence action against
Bob and Charles, the two alleged cotortfeasors. Damages alleged
are $100,000. Sometime prior to trial, Bob enters into a loan re-
ceipt agreement with Adam whereby Bob "loans" Adam $75,000.
The agreement provides the following: (1) Any recovery from
Charles over $5,000 will be returned to Bob to the extent that
Bob is not given more than $75,000.' (2) Bob will remain in the
suit as a codefendant. (3) Adam promises not to execute against
Bob in the event a verdict is rendered against Bob and Charles.
(4) To the extent that Adam's recovery does not exceed the
$75,000 loan, that amount is to be considered a payment by Bob.'
It is absolutely crucial to distinguish between the two main
contexts in which loan agreements appear: (1) the aforemen-
tioned traditional plaintiff-insured and plaintiff's-insurer context,
and (2) the more recent plaintiff-codefendant context. Through-
out this article the distinction between these two situations will
be maintained, because in the former there are several positive
reasons in favor of loan agreements while in the latter several
negative reasons exist for prohibition of loan receipt agreements.
This article is designed to help the practicing attorney chal-
lenge the validity of loan receipt agreements in the plaintiff-
codefendant context.' Three basic questions provide the founda-
4. Thus, if Adam secures an $80,000 judgment against both Bob and
Charles but levies only against poor Charles, then Bob gets his original
$75,000. Financially, Bob is left in a net zero position with the added benefit
that his liability exposure to Adam has been extinguished. Adam, on the
other hand, has the original $75,000 given by Bob plus an additional $5,000
as provided by the conditions of the agreement. The real loser is Charles.
5. Thus, if Adam recovers $40,000 from Charles, only $25,000 is re-
turned to Bob. The agreement allows Adam to keep the first $5,000 of re-
covery. Accordingly, the $50,000 which Bob loaned but was reimbursed is
magically transformed from a loan into a payment. Adam's failure to re-
cover a greater verdict makes Bob the loser in this situation.
6. The issue whether loan receipt devices should be admissible as evi-
dence is beyond the scope of this article. It may be noted, however, that
there are at least three approaches to admissibility into evidence of loan re-
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tion for the article. First, what are the characteristics of a fiction?
Second, is a loan receipt a fiction? Third, what are the limits that
should be placed on the use of this fiction? This writer explores
the rule that fictions are equitable devices designed to achieve
equitable results. It is noted that the Supreme Court has held
that fictions should be strictly construed and confined to the origi-
nal context in which they were developed.7 Next, after an his-
ceipt devices. One approach holds that the devices are within the cognizance
of the court and the parties, but are not admissible as evidence properly sub-
mitted to the jury. Klotz v. Lee, 36 N.J. Super. 6, 114 A.2d 746 (1955). An-
other approach holds that the devices are admissible in cross-examination
for the limited purpose of attacking the motive and credibility of witnesses,
but not on the liability or damage issues. Reese v. Chicago, B&O R.R.,
55 Ill.2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973). The third approach holds that since
the device tends to have the effect of encouraging collusion or dishonest
practices on the part of the agreeing codefendant, such agreements must,
upon the request of a non-agreeing codefendant, be produced for purposes
of pretrial discovery and be introduced into evidence. Failure to do so will
constitute prejudicial error. Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 602 (1975).
The issue of separate trials is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice
it to say that in NIPSCO v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 250 N.E.2d 378 (1969),
the sole issue before the court was whether a separate trial should have been
granted the non-agreeing codefendant. The court, speaking through Judge
Sharp, noted that it is within the discretion of the trial court whether to
grant such motion. Since Indiana recognizes the policy of limiting the num-
ber of trials as far as possible, the Otis court denied the motion. Judicial
time is saved; the plaintiff who may have been seriously injured is not forced
to undergo two lengthy trials; and there is no risk where there is one trial
that two juries might believe the absent defendant was the wrongdoer leav-
ing the plaintiff totally uncompensated. The Otis court noted that the test
for a separate trial is whether the moving party has affirmatively shown
that legal prejudice either will result or will likely result. Id. at 389. The
court cannot anticipate that instructions will confuse the jury. Nor is the
fact that codefendants are antagonistic an affirmative showing of legal
prejudice. Id. at 390. But since the second part of the test requires only a
showing that prejudice "will likely result," it is incredible that the Otis court
did not reverse the trial court on the ground that a device which encourages
perjury is a sufficient showing that prejudice will likely result.
7. Blackstone v. Miller 188 U.S. 189 (1919) ; United States v. 1960 Bags
of Coffee, 3 U.S. (8 Cranch) 188, 198 (1814) ("It seems to be a rule founded
in common sense, as well as strict justice, that 'fictions of law' shall not be
permitted to work any wrong, but shall be used ut res magis valeat quam
pereat."); Purdy v. McGarity, 30 N.Y.S.2d 966, 262 A. 623 (1941); Parker
Peanut Co. v. Felder, 200 S.C. 203, 20 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1942) ("Fictions are
invented and instituted for the promotion of justice. It is a certain rule that
a fiction of law shall never be contradicted so as to defeat the end for which
it was invented, but for every other purpose it may be contradicted."). Cf.
95 U. PA. L. Rav. 231, 234 (1946) ("the use of a legal device, proper in
its setting, should not be extended to a situation foreign to its nature for
the purpose of thwarting the decisions of the courts.").
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torical analysis, it is concluded that loan receipt agreements are
fictions for something that really amounts to a payment. To
effectively convey the idea that the term, "loan receipt agree-
ment," is merely a label, it is crucial to consistently refer to the
transaction either as a "fiction" or as a "device." Precise use of
language helps lay the foundation for fiction treatment of the so-
called loan receipt. Accordingly, it is concluded that loan receipts
should be narrowly construed and confined to the original insurer-
insured context in which they were initiated, not extended into
the plaintiff-codefendant area. To facilitate presentation of the
relevant arguments, frequent reference is made to Indiana law.
It is felt that this reliance on Indiana law is particularly appro-
priate since Indiana is currently one of the leading jurisdictions
favoring the use of these devices.' Since careful separation of
the factual context from which the agreement arises is essential
in evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of allowing such
agreements, the following outline will be utilized to help clarify
the issues and demonstrate the interrelationship of these issues.
I. ORIGIN OF THE So-CALLED LOAN
RECEIPT AGREEMENT .... ............. 235
A. Needs for the Fiction .... ........... .. 235
B. Evidence of the Fiction ... .......... .. 237
1. Outright Recognition of Fiction .. ...... .. 237
2. Obvious Lack of Mutual Intent
to Create A Loan .... ........... .241
a. Insurer's liability is absolute .. ...... .. 241
b. Insurer makes full payment .. ...... .. 242
3. Where No Need for Fiction, Transaction Properly
Characterized as Payment: The
Wisconsin View .... ............ . 243
C. Significance of the Fact that Loan Receipt
Agreements Are A Fiction .... ......... .243
8. Scott v. Krueger, 280 N.E.2d 336 (1972); American Transport Co.
v. Central Indiana Ry., 255 Ind. 319, 264 N.E.2d 64 (1970); NIPSCO v. Otis,
145 Ind. App. 159, 250 N.E.2d 378 (1969) ; Klukas v. Yount, 121 Ind. App. 160,
98 N.E.2d 227 (1951). Two additional reasons for relying on Indiana law
are that the INDIANA CIODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY was adopted from
the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, and that the Indiana Trial
Rules are modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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II. BEYOND THE INSURER-INSURED SHIPPER
CONTEXT: LATER DEVELOPMENTS . ........ 244
A. Prejudice to the Court .... ........... .. 246
1. Violation of Ethics .... ........... .. 246
2. Contra to Public Policy on Grounds
Other than Ethical Violations .. ....... .. 251
3. Circumvention of Rule Prohibiting
Contribution or Indemnity Between
Cotortfeasors ..... ............. 252
4. Circumvention of Real Party
In Interest Statute .... ........... .. 252
5. Circumvention of Rule Barring
Assignment of Tort Claims .. ........ . 254
6. Circumvention of Rule Barring Champerty. . 254
B. Prejudice to Non-agreeing Codefendant ..... ... 256
I. ORIGIN OF THE SO-CALLED LOAN
RECEIPT AGREEMENT
A. Needs for the Fiction
The label, "loan receipt agreement," originally referred to a
fiction used exclusively in the insurer-insured context.' The loan
receipt device appears to have had its origin in the struggle be-
tween common carriers and insurers to shift the burden of loss
upon each other.'" The carrier would insert in his bill of lading a
provision that the carrier should have the benefit of any insur-
ance carried by the shipper. Contra to the carrier's provision,
marine and inland marine insurers inserted stipulations in policies
issued to shippers that the insurers would not be liable for any loss
for which the carrier was liable regardless of the carrier's provi-
sion in the bill of lading to the contrary. And further, the insurers
stipulated that the shipper-insured would make no agreement and
do no act whereby the insurer's right of action against the carrier
might be affected. In the face of such conflicting provisions, a
shipper whose cargo had been damaged or destroyed might be out
of funds until final adjudication of an action by him against the
9. See Luckenbach v. W.J. Mcahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139
(1918).
10. See 13 A.L.R.3d 42 (1967).
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carrier determining whether the carrier was liable. To keep alive
the carrier's liability and prevent the inequitable shifting of a
burden which was rightfully the carrier's to the shipper's insurer,
and to fulfill its contractual obligation of providing indemnity to
its insured, the insurers devised the loan receipt.
From the insurer's point of view there were two main ad-
vantages to the loan receipt agreement. First and certainly fore-
most in the minds of the insurers, it preserved the insurer's rights
against negligent carriers, serving to extinguish the insurer's lia-
bility completely where the insured's suit against the carrier was
successful." Second, the device fulfilled the insurer's contractual
obligation to its insured to provide an indemnity.'" Although the
insurer's duty to indemnify was often contingent upon the car-
rier's nonliability,'3 by definition, indemnity necessarily includes
immediate reimbursement.' 4 Any delay in reimbursement would
impair a shipper's ability to meet its commercial contracts with
suppliers, thereby compounding the insured-shipper's injury.
In the insurer-insured context then, for all practical purposes,
the insured-shipper had received payments for his loss, not a loan.
If there was any recovery from the carrier, the money ultimately
went from the carrier to the insurer, not to the insured in whose
name the action had been instituted. And if there was no re-
covery at all from the carrier, then the insurer was bound by a
provision of the device to magically transform the loan into a
payment. The shipper-insured could not lose under such an ar-
rangement where the insurer's liability was absolute or the amount
of the loan was for the full amount of the shipper-insured's loss.'"
Since the device was characterized by courts as a loan, rather
than a payment, the insurer received the benefit of avoiding sub-
rogation.' Suit against the carrier was instituted in the name of
its insured-shipper. Three main reasons existed for characterizing
the device as a loan: (1) The economy of the entire country was
benefited by such a fiction. The United States, toward the end
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139
(1918).
14. The meaning of indemnity is to place the insured in the same posi-
tion he would have been in had the injury pot occurred. See Luckenbach v.
W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139, 146 (1918) (recognizing the
rule).
15. See notes 42 and 44 infra.
16. 248 U.S. at 146-49.
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of the nineteenth century, was trying to expand its commercial
trade. Immediate indemnity by insurers to their insured-shippers
was essential to a growing commerce.' (2) The fiction helped
the insured meet his personal business losses. 8 (3) The fiction
helped the insurer avoid judicially recognized jury prejudice
against insurance companies." It is absolutely crucial for pre-
cise analysis that these three judicially recognized needs for the
fiction are kept in mind. Throughout the remainder of the arti-
cle the question will be asked whether these three original needs
are present today in other potential loan receipt contexts.
B. Evidence of the Fiction
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the need
for the loan receipt device existed at its inception. The next ques-
tion to consider is whether the device has been treated by the
courts as a true loan or whether it has been recognized as a fic-
tion created to meet equitable goals. The following survey is de-
signed to establish that the so-called loan receipt agreement is not
a loan but is in fact a payment. That is, the term, loan receipt
agreement, is nothing more than a label or fiction for some-
thing else.
1. Outright Recognition of Fiction
The landmark case validating the use of loan receipt agree-
ments in the insurer-insured context is Luckenbach v. W.J. McCa-
Ian Sugar Ref. Co.2 0 Luckenbach involved an inherent conflict
between the printed forms of insurers and carriers. More spe-
cifically, this was an action wherein the bills of lading provided
that the carrier should have the benefit of any insurance procured
by the shippers. On the other hand, the insurance policies pro-
vided that the insurer should not be liable to the insured-shipper
if the carrier was liable. The Court, speaking through Justice
Brandeis, upheld a loan receipt between a shipper and its insurer
as a valid loan:
The carrier insists that the transaction, while in terms
of a loan, is in substance a payment of insurance; that
to treat it as if it were a loan is to follow the letter of
the agreement and to disregard the actual facts; and that
17. Id. at 146.
18. Id. at 149.
19. See 13 A.L.R.3d 42 (1967).
20. 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
1976]
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to give it effect as a loan is to sanction fiction and sub-
terfuge. But no good reason appears either for question-
ing its legality or for denying its effects.2'
A superficial reading of the above language indicates that
the Court rejected the idea that the whole transaction was a fic-
tion. But closer analysis of the Court's rationale reveals the op-
posite. Throughout the bulk of the Court's opinion, Justice Bran-
deis carefully indicates that the loan characterization was justi-
fied by the specific equities in the insurer-insured context.2 2 The
shipper was under no obligation to the carrier to take out insur-
ance on cargo. The carrier did not lower rates if the shipper did
take out insurance on the cargo. The general law relevant to
shipper-carriers did not give the carrier, upon payment of the
shipper's claim, a right by subrogation against the insurers. The
insurer, on the other hand, by general law relevant to insurer-
insured, provided the insurer with a right of subrogation against
the carrier. And the demands of commerce sanctioned the prac-
tice.23 Thus, no party to the suit was prejudiced by the charac-
terization and several needs justified it. This type of analysis was
the crux of the Luckenbach decision although the Court puts a
gloss over its analysis by alluding to the traditional test for a valid
loan-the intent of the parties.2 "
If intent of the parties was the exclusive test there would
have been no need to carefully note that no party was prejudiced
by the characterization and that the needs of commerce sanctioned
it. When Justice Brandeis talks about the "needs of commerce"
and the "demands of justice,"2 the logical reference is to the
country's growing economy and the equitable result of protecting
insurance companies from jury prejudice. It is imperative to
note that these are equitable justifications for a fiction and have
nothing to do with the traditional test for a loan 2 --the party's
intent. Furthermore, the idea that Justice Brandeis was justify-
ing the use of a fiction is buttressed by the Court's language. Con-
21. Id. at 148.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 149.
25. Id.
26. Id. See also Thompson v. Arnold, 238 Ind. 177, 147 N.E.2d 903
(1958); Wayne Pump v. Gross Income Tax Div., 232 Ind. 147, 110 N.E.2d
284 (1952); Klukas v. Yount, 121 Ind. App. 160, 98 N.E.2d 227 (1951);
Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 42, 54-56 (1967).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1976], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/2
LOAN AGREEMENTS
tinually the transaction is referred to as "so-called loans,"", and
agreements which were "devised."'28
. Subsequent to Luckenbach's sanction of the loan receipt fic-
tion in the insurer-insured context, other courts" have expressly
noted the fictional nature of the transaction. One approach has
been to recognize the label, loan receipt agreement, as a mere fic-
tion, then to decide if the equities in a given case justify the use
of a fiction.3" For instance, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Aetna
Freight Lines, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co.3 expressly recognized that
the difference between a loan under a loan receipt and an abso-
lute payment under a policy is a mere fiction.2 But the context
in which the loan receipt originated was decisive. The plaintiff
had borrowed from his own liability insurer, essentially the same
context in which the fiction was validated by Luckenbach. The
court upheld the transaction as a valid loan on two grounds:
(1) no party would be prejudiced by use of the fiction, and (2) the
insurer should be protected from jury bias.3
Seventeen years after the Tway decision, the Kentucky Su-
preme Court again expressly recognized loan receipts as a fiction,
27. 248 U.S. at 148.
28. Id. at 149.
29. See generally Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S.
139 (1918); Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 602 (1975); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 1111
(1973); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 42 (1967).
30. Biven v. Charlie's Hobby Shop, 500 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1973); Aetna
Freight Lines, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 298 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1956); Blair v.
Espeland, 231 Minn. 444, 43 N.W.2d 274 (1950); Herring v. Jackson, 255
N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 160, 249 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1964);
Purdy v. McGarity, 262 App. Div. 623, 30 N.Y.S.2d 966, appeal denied, 263
App. Div. 905, 32 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1941).
31. 298 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1956) (case involving consolidated actions by
the ultimate purchaser and by the user-lessee of a tractor-trailer against the
manufacturer to recover the amounts paid in settlement of actions in Ohio
for death and personal injuries resulting from a collision in that state of
the tractor-trailer and an automobile, allegedly caused by negligent manu-
facture of the tractor-trailer).
32. The Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
While it is clear that the difference between a loan of the type under
consideration and an absolute payment is mere fiction, that ground
alone is insufficient to declare the transaction a nullity. Rather, we
will look to the purpose of the fiction created by the parties to the
transaction.
Id. at 296.
33. Id.
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but this time denied their validity as a loan. " The determinative
factor was a change in factual contexts. Tway involved an in-
sured and his insurer. The later Kentucky Supreme Court deci-
sion involved a loan receipt agreement between a plaintiff and
one of two potentially liable tortfeasors. Commerce would not be
facilitated, nor was there any contractual obligation to provide
indemnity to the plaintiff by the codefendant. The needs which
originally gave rise to the fiction were not present in the plain-
tiff-cotortfeasor area.
Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court referred to a loan
receipt as a "device."" New York courts have held that loan re-
ceipts were in fact an absolute payment coupled with a fictional
implementation to allow the insurer to sue in the insured's name."
Likewise, the North Carolina Supreme Court expressly recognized
a loan receipt as a fiction. 7 More specifically the North Carolina
Supreme Court refused to extend the fiction into a plaintiff-
cotortfeasor area since to do so would be to allow a fiction to cir-
cumvent the state's strong policy barring contributions between
cotortfeasors. These and other similar holdings 8 reflect a judi-
cial awareness that fictions are equitable devices designed to
achieve equitable results. Hence, where any party is prejudiced
by the use of a fiction or where public policy is contravened, the
fiction should be prohibited.
34. Biven v. Charlie's Hobby Shop, 500 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1973) (minor
accidentally shot and killed by another child using an allegedly defective
pistol manufactured by one of the defendants and sold by the other, the agree-
ment providing that the administratrix for the decedent's estate give up all
claims she might have against the parents of the negligent child in return
for an interest-free loan of $20,000 from the parents' insurance company, re-
payable only to the extent of the administratrix net recovery from any other
person or entity responsible for the accident).
35. Blair v. Espeland, 231 Minn. 444, 43 N.W.2d 274, 277-78 (1950).
36. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 160, 249 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1964).
37. Herring v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961).
38. Purdy v. McGarity, 262 App. Div. 623, 30 N.Y.S.2d 966, appeal de-
nied, 263 App. Div. 905, 32 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1941) (considering loan receipt
whereby the insured received from its own insurer $69.95 as a loan and re-
payable only to the extent of any net recovery which the insured may make
from any person or persons, corporation or corporations, by reason of the
damage to the insured's car, the court stated: "It strains our credulity too
far to treat that agreement as one for a loan .... [T]o say that this trans-
action constitutes a loan is a fiction and a sham."). Id. at 970.
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2. Obvious Lack of Mutual Intent to Create A Loan
Although some courts expressly recognize loan receipts as a
fiction, other courts take a more euphemistic approach. These
latter courts pay lip service to the proposition that whether a loan
receipt transaction is a payment or a loan is resolved by looking
to the mutual intention of the parties to the transaction." To
ascertain the mutual intent, courts look not only to the face of
the agreement but also to the surrounding circumstances."0 This
means that the label which parties give to a transaction is not
controlling. For instance, in a leading Indiana case" the parties
had labeled their transaction a sale, but the Indiana Supreme
Court pierced the form and looked to the substance of the trans-
action, holding it to be a loan." In spite of this clear method for
ascertaining the mutuality of intent requisite to the creation of a
valid loan, the cases cited in the next two subheadings of this
article have upheld the so-called loan receipt as a valid loan.
Mutual intent to create a loan simply is not found in the circum-
stances of these cases. The purpose of presenting the following
cases is to establish further the fact that loan receipt devices are
fictions, not true loans.
a. Insurer's liability is absolute
Many courts 3 have upheld the use of loan receipt devices
where the insurer is absolutely liable to the insured for the loss.
39. See Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139
(1918); Klukas v. Yount, 121 Ind. App. 160, 98 N.E.2d 227 (1951); Annot.,
13 A.L.R.3d 42, 54-56 (1967).
40. Wayne Pump v. Gross Income Tax Div., 232 Ind. 147, 110 N.E.2d
284 (1952) (an action to determine whether a transaction was a bona fide
sale of conditional sales contracts or whether it was in fact a loan with the
assignment of conditional sales contracts as security for a loan for purposes
of calculating gross income tax).
41. Id.
42. Accord, Thompson v. Arnold, 238 Ind. 177, 147 N.E.2d 903 (1958).
43. In Williams v. Union Pacific R.R., 94 F. Supp. 174 (D. Neb. 1950),
an action by an insured owner for loss of a building and its contents by fire
allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence, the insurance contracts held
by the plaintiff imposed an absolute liability on the several insurers conse-
quent on the loss by fire. Nonetheless, advancements made to the plaintiff
by its insurers under loan receipts were held to be loans and not payments.
Accord, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Henry DuBois Sons Co., 144 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 797 (action by insurance companies for declara-
tory judgment concerning their liabilities where in a suit of cross libels the
defendant's insurer had paid the defendant the entire amount of defendant's
loss; held to be valid loan regardless of absolute liability and full reimburse-
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In such a context, the plaintiff is entitled to immediate indemnity
from its insured. So commerce is neither facilitated by the device
nor is the insured enabled to meet private business losses by the
device; payment would have been forthcoming anyway. The only
effect of the fiction in this context is to enable the insurer to re-
coup its liability payment from one of the defendants by main-
taining an action in the name of its insured. The fact that only
the insurer benefits where he is absolutely liable is compelling
evidence that the transaction is a fiction.
b. Insurer makes full payment
Where the insurer advances the entire amount of plaintiff-
insured's loss pursuant to a loan receipt it would stretch the
imagination beyond limits to say that the plaintiff considered
such advance a loan. In a practical sense, the plaintiff's loss is
entirely reimbursed. Only in the event that plaintiff's suit against
the defendant prevails will money be returned to the insurer. In no
ment of loss); Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co.,
147 So. 542 (La. App. 1933) (conditional vendor's action against conditional
vendee to recover unpaid purchase price of sprinkler system which was de-
stroyed by fire after installation; conditional vendor's insurer, absolutely
liable under provisions of policy, advanced to vendor-insured entire amount
of loss under loan receipt authorizing insurer to prosecute suit in insured's
name but at the total expense and under exclusive control of insurer);
Waumbec Mills, Inc. v. Bohnson Service Co., 193 N.H. 461, 174 A.2d 839
(1961); Furrer v. Yew Creek Logging Co., 206 Ore. 382, 292 P.2d 499 (1956)
(insurer's absolute liability no bar to valid loan where plaintiff may have
chosen to take something less than absolute payment to which he was entitled
under his insurance policy); Arabian American Oil Co. v. Kirby & Kirby,
Inc., 171 Pa. Super. 23, 90 A.2d 410 (1952) (court noting that loan receipt
was device necessary for the protection of the insurer) ; Cadillac Auto Co. v.
Fisher, 54 R.I. 264, 172 A. 393 (1934); Colonial Finance Corp. v. Schnacht
Motor Truck Co., 52 R.I. 317, 160 A. 787 (1932); Wrenn v. Outlaw, Inc. v.
Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 246 S.C. 97, 142 S.E.2d 741 (1965); W.
Wesley Singletary & Sons, Inc. v. Lake City State Bank, 243 S.C. 180, 133
S.E.2d 118 (1963); Martin v. McLeod, 241 S.C. 71, 127 S.E.2d 129 (1962)
(insurer, absolutely liable, advanced full amount of loss under loan receipt
agreement, which court characterized as valid loan); Phillips v. Clifton Mfg.
Co., 204 S.C. 496, 30 S.E.2d 146 (1944) (insured's action for damages to auto
allegedly caused by defendant's negligence; held to be loan even though plain-
tiff's insurer was absolutely liable for loss and had advanced entire amount
of loss minus $50 deductible under loan receipt device).
But see Yezek v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R., 176 Misc.
553, 28 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1941) where the court concluded that a loan receipt
was a payment without regard to its label as a loan agreement on one main
ground: the insurer was absolutely liable; therefore, the use of a fiction was
unnecessary to secure prompt payment to the insured and no mutuality of
consent existed to justify its characterization as a loan.
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event will plaintiff's recovery be increased or decreased by the
outcome of the suit. Thus, where an insurer advances the full
amount of plaintiff's loss, the circumstances do not reveal a mutual
intent which is requisite to the creation of a loan. Nonetheless,
some cases involving total reimbursement disregard the test for
a valid loan-mutuality of intent-and hoist the loan-receipt fic-
tion to help insurers recoup their advances."'
3. Where No Need for Fiction, Transaction Properly
Characterized As Payment: The Wisconsin View
Absent one of the needs for the fiction-to protect insurers
from jury bias 4"-the Wisconsin Supreme Court" pierced the form
of the agreement and held it to be a payment, not a loan. In
Kopperud v. Chick,4" an automobile liability insurer brought an
action to recoup, by way of indemnity from a joint tortfeasor,
money paid to its insured in settlement of death and personal in-
jury claims against its insured as a cotortfeasor. Under Wisconsin
law, a person injured in an automobile accident may sue the in-
surer directly," so the need to avoid subrogation due to jury bias
did not exist. In addition, the use of the loan receipts for such
purpose would have given an advantage to the insurer by hiding
its identity while the identity of the third person's insurer could
be disclosed. Where there was no need for the fiction and where
prejudice would result if the fiction were used, the Kopperud
court rejected the fiction that the transaction was a loan.
C. Significance of the Fact that A Loan Receipt
Agreement Is A Fiction
The significance of establishing that a loan receipt device is
a fiction can be demonstrated by reviewing the methodology sug-
gested in this article. (1) Fictions are equitable devices designed
to achieve justice among all parties. (2) Courts narrowly con-
strue fictions, limiting them to the contexts in which fictions
originate. (3) A loan receipt agreement is a fiction. (4) Courts
44. See Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139
(1918); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Henry DeBois Sons Co., 144 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 797; Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Robinson-
Slagle Lumber Co., 147 So. 542 (La. App. 1933); Phillips v. Clifton Mfg. Co.,
204 S.C. 496, 30 S.E.2d 146 (1944).
45. See subheading, Needs for the Fiction, supra.
46. Kopperud v. Chick, 27 Wis. 2d 591, 135 N.W.2d 335 (1965).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 339.
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should narrowly construe the application of the loan receipt fic-
tion. (5) Therefore, the loan receipt fiction should not be ex-
tended into the plaintiff-codefendant context where the court and
non-agreeing codefendants would be prejudiced, and where the
needs which originally gave rise to the device are absent.
II. BEYOND THE INSURER-INSURED SHIPPER CONTEXT:
LATER DEVELOPMENTS
Once it is established that a loan receipt device is a fiction,
it is crucial to remember that loan receipt devices originated in a
very specific historical context involving insured shippers and
their insurers.'9 Shrewd attorneys, however, have duped courts
into expanding the use of the loan receipt fiction. As a result,
loan receipt devices now are employed in the plaintiff-codefendant
context.5" Close scrutiny reveals that the two aforementioned fac-
tual contexts involve completely different equities and reasons
justifying the use or the non-use of loan receipts.
For example, the landmark Supreme Court case sanctioning
the use of the loan receipt fiction was Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan
Sugar Ref. Co.5' This case, however, is distinguishable on the
facts and distinguishable on the law from the recent use of loan
receipts in the plaintiff-codefendant context. It is factually dis-
tinguishable in the following respects: (1) the Luckenbach device
was between an insurer and its insured-shipper pursuant to their
prior contractual relations. The device of the loan agreement was
employed to satisfy, at least partially, the contractual obligation
of the insurance company. In the more recent factual setting,
there is no contractual relation between the plaintiff and the co-
tortfeasor other than the loan agreement arising after the injury.
The cotortfeasor has no duty to enter into a loan agreement.
(2) Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Luckenbach Court, spe-
cifically noted that the loan receipt device would facilitate the ex-
pansion of the United States' commercial trade.2 Quick reim-
bursement of loss in commerce was essential to enable the shipper
to fulfill contracts with other buyers. In contrast, any nexus be-
tween the plaintiff-codefendant setting and commerce is hard to
perceive. The latter context usually involves a simple personal
49. See Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139
(1918).
50. See, e.g., NIPSCO v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 250 N.E.2d 378 (1969);
Lum v. Stinnet, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
51. 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
52. Id. at 148.
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injury case in which the compelling demands of the national well-
being do not justify the use of a fiction. In fact, the primary
effect of the device in a plaintiff-codefendant context is to insu-
late the cotortfeasor from ultimate liability. And further, the
plaintiff is advanced money to which he may already be entitled
from his own insurer. In short, the needs which originally gave
rise to the loan receipt fiction do not exist in the plaintiff-codefen-
dant area. Factual dissimilarity alone is sufficient reason to limit
the use of the fiction in areas not contemplated by .Luckenbach.
Luckenbach, however, is also distinguishable on the law in
the following respects. Trial Rule 17(a)" requires that "every
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in in-
terest." This language means that one seeking relief upon a claim
legally or equitably must own the claim under the substantive law
of the state.5" Therefore, in determining who is the real party in
interest under Rule 17(a), a court in a diversity of citizenship
case5" must first ascertain who has the substantive right of action
under the controlling substantive state law. Luckenbach is not
controlling on this substantive issue since that case was decided
under the principles of Swift v. Tyson"5 at a time when it was
thought that there was federal common law. Of course, Swift's
authority was extinguished in 1938 when the Supreme Court over-
ruled it in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 7 Erie held that there is no
federal common law and that all substantive law of a state in
which the district court sits should be applied. Thus, any case
after 1938 which relies on Luckenbach as authority for the sub-
stantive real party in interest question is incorrectly decided.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the landmark Su-
preme Court case validating such devices is distinguishable both
on the facts and on the law from the plaintiff-cotortfeasor con-
text. Further, close scrutiny reveals that the needs which origi-
nally gave rise to the loan receipt fiction do not exist in the plain-
tiff-cotortfeasor area. Any one of these reasons alone would be
sufficient for limiting the use of the fiction in question. Com-
prehensive analysis, however, requires a further probe into the
effects of expanding use of loan receipts into the plaintiff-
53. It should be noted that Indiana Trial Rule 17(a) was modeled after
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
54. Rosenfeld v. Continental Bldg. Operating Co., 135 F. Supp. 465
(W.D. Mo. 1955); 3 MooRE's FEiERAL PRACTcEc, 17.02 at 1305 (2d ed. 1964).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1966).
56. 16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (U.S. 1842).
57. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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cotortfeasor context. The following discussion outlines several
highly prejudicial effects both to the court and to the non-agreeing
codefendant arising from the application of the fiction in the
plaintiff-cotortfeasor context.
A. Prejudice to the Court
1. Violation of Ethics
The validity of enforceability of a loan receipt device in the
plaintiff-cotortfeasor area must first be judged in light of a law-
yer's ethical responsibility. Several preliminary, but fundamental,
maxims should be kept in mind. The Indiana Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, concerning contact with witnesses, pro-
vides: "A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the
payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the con-
tent of his testimony or the outcome of the case."58 The rationale
underlying this directive is that courts ought to be protected from
the danger of collusion and perjury even if none may in fact
exist. 9 Lawyers, as officers of the court, are held to the highest
standards in the execution of their fiduciary duties to the court."
Accordingly, the Ethical Considerations state, "Witnesses should
always testify truthfully and should be free from any financial
inducements that might tempt them to do otherwise. [I]n no
event should a lawyer pay or agree to pay a contingent fee to
any witness.""
The language of the New York Supreme Court'2 is instructive:
The prevalence of perjury is a serious menace to the
administration of justice, to prevent which no means
have as yet been satisfactorily devised. But there cer-
tainly can be no greater incentive to perjury than to
allow a party to make payments to its opponent's wit-
nesses under any guise or any excuse, and at least attor-
neys who are officers of the Court to aid in the adminis-
tration of justice, must keep themselves clear of any con-
nection which in the slightest degree tends to induce wit-
nesses to testify in favor of their client."
58. INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(c).
59. See INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (avoid-
ing the appearance of impropriety even though none may in fact exist).
60. INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble.
61. INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-28.
62. In re Robinson, 156 App. Div. 589, 136 N.Y.S. 548 (1912), af'd,
209 N.Y. 354, 103 N.E. 160 (1913).
63. Id. at 600, 136 N.Y.S. at 556-57 (emphasis added). Cf., INDIANA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-25.
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The idea of fiduciary responsibility and protection for the courts
even from the possibility of perjury or fraud is further established
by Opinion F99 of the Indiana Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. Therein it states that it is professionally improper for an
attorney to bring a suit on behalf of a mother, owner of an auto-
mobile in which she was riding, against her son who was driving,
in order to recover against an insurance company for her injury
through her son's negligence. The reason such suit would be im-
proper is that the court would be exposed to the risk of col-
lusion and perjury between parties of supposedly conflicting
interests.
A lawyer who enters into a loan agreement in the plaintiff-
codefendant context breaches his aforementioned fiduciary duties
to the court and to the fair administration of justice" in the fol-
lowing respects: (1) it is a collusive agreement between parties
of supposedly adverse interest, thereby creating an inherent dan-
ger for perjury; (2) it misleads the jury into thinking that the
agreeing tortfeasor who sits at the defendant's table is adverse to
the interests of the plaintiff when in fact he participates in the
proceeds of the plaintiff's recovery; and (3) it deprives the non-
agreeing codefendant of a substantial number of peremptory chal-
lenges which it must share with the agreeing tortfeasor.
The Nevada Supreme Court has been at the forefront in rec-
ognizing the ethical problems which inhere when loan receipts are
used in the plaintiff-codefendant area. In Lum v. Stinnett," a loan
receipt agreement between plaintiff and two of the defendant doc-
tors provided that the two agreeing defendants would pay a sum
necessary to bring recovery up to $20,000 if the jury awarded
less than that amount. In return, the plaintiff promised not to
execute against the agreeing physicians if the verdict exceeded
$20,000. Further, the plaintiff agreed to prosecute his action
against the non-agreeing physician and not to settle with him for
less than $20,000. The Nevada Supreme Court found the agree-
ment unethical and therefore violative of public policy. Specifi-
cally, the agreement violated the prohibition against representing
64. INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-5 clearly states
that "Fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a participant in
a proceeding before a tribunal or legislative body is inconsistent with the
fair administration of justice ... "
65. 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971) (malpractice action by a patient
against three physicians alleging they negligently failed to detect and treat
a compression fracture of the spine).
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conflicting interests6 in that defendants' lawyers were represent-
ing the interest of the plaintiff in an effort to encourage a large
jury verdict against their own side in the litigation. Lawyers for
the agreeing defendant doctors violated the canon which requires
that a lawyer's conduct before the court and other lawyers be
characterized by candor and fairness."' In addition, the Code of
Professional Responsibility was violated in that it prohibits a
lawyer from taking technical advantage of opposing counsel. "8
Finally, the Lum court held that the agreement violated the pro-
hibition that it is unprofessional for a lawyer to stir up strife
and litigation. 9
The Lum court took special note of a dilemma. The plaintiff
could call an agreeing cotortfeasor as an adverse witness. The
non-agreeing codefendant would then be forced on cross-examina-
tion to impeach the witness with a device containing self-serving
language." The Nevada Supreme Court supported its decision by
66. See INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1908).
67. Id. See INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 22
(1908).
68. Id. See INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 25
(1908).
69. Id. See INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 28
(1908).
70. Insertion of self-serving language is a gimmick used by parties to
the fiction in order to deter the non-agreeing defendant from introducing the
device into evidence. Following is an example of typical self-serving lan-
guage. The device was entered into by plaintiffs Delbert and Regina Otis
and defendant NIPSCO in the case of Northern Indiana Public Service Com-
pany v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 250 N.E.2d 378 (1969):
WHEREAS, Delbert Otis and Regina Otis are husband and wife and
residents of Fort Wayne, Indiana; Northern Indiana Public Service Com-
pany (NIPSCO) is a public utility, engaged, among other things in supply-
ing natural gas to residents of Fort Wayne, Indiana; John Drehner, Inc.
("Drehner") is a construction company; and
WHEREAS, in the year 1951 NIPSCO, embarked upon a construction
program which included the installation of a main for the transmission of
natural gas under a portion of a certain thoroughfare in Fort Wayne known
as "Broadway." NIPSCO, and Drehner entered into a written agreement
dated July 16, 1951, under which Drehner agreed to install said main;
Drehner in fact installed said main; and
WHEREAS, a gas explosion occurred in said main on February 3, 1966,
allegedly inflicting severe and painful injuries upon Regina Otis and al-
legedly causing consequential damages in a large amount to her husband,
Delbert Otis; and
WHEREAS, Regina Otis has brought an action in the Allen Superior
Court No. 3, Allen County, Indiana, to recover for her injuries and for the
resulting pain and suffering of which action bears the Cause No. 11540;
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Delbert Otis has brought an action in the Superior Court of Allen County,
Allen County, Indiana, to recover for his consequential damages; Drehner
and NIPSCO, are joined as defendants in each action; and
WHEREAS, the Complaint in each action is drafted upon the theory
that said explosion was caused by negligent acts and omissions on the part
of each of the defendants and that the defendants are jointly and severally
liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs; and
WHEREAS, NIPSCO denies that it was negligent in such manner as
to cause said explosion and denies that it is liable to the plaintiff in either
of the aforesaid actions; but NIPSCO realizes that it might be unable to
establish that it is not liable; and so NIPSCO maintains in the alternative,
(a) that any liability on its part is secondary; (b) that Drehner is pri-
marily liable to Regina Otis and Delbert Otis; (c) that NIPSCO would be
entitled to indemnity from Drehner for any monies it might pay Regina
Otis and/or Delbert Otis, either as the result of a judgment in the afore-
said actions, or either of them, or as the result of a compromise and settle-
ment; (d) that NIPSCO would be entitled to such indemnity both expressly
under the terms of the aforesaid written agreement dated July 16, 1951, and
impliedly under the principles of law applicable when one secondarily liable
makes payments to satisfy in whole or in part an obligation for which an-
other is primarily liable; and
WHEREAS, NIPSCO recognizes that the facts are such as to provide
a substantial possibility that the plaintiff will be awarded judgment against
each defendant in each of the aforesaid actions; NIPSCO further recognizes
that any such judgment would, in all probability, be for a large sum of
money, particularly in the action brought by Regina Otis where any judg-
ment for her would probably be in excess of $50,000.00; and
WHEREAS, NIPSCO recognizes that the plaintiff in each of the afore-
said actions could if awarded judgment against each defendant execute the
same, in whole or in part, against NIPSCO as he or she chose; that the
plaintiff would not have to collect any part of such judgment from Drehner
unless he or she wished; that the plaintiffs' rights with regard to the col-
lection of any such judgment would be unaffected by NIPSCO's assertion
that any liability on its part is secondary; and
WHEREAS, Delbert Otis and Regina Otis believe that their position in
each of the aforesaid actions is strong but they recognize that the ultimate
disposition of said action, including appeals, is probably at least three years
in the future, particularly inasmuch as Drehner has pursued a policy of
delay from the very inception of the aforesaid litigation; pursuant to such
policy of delay Drehner has filed frivolous pleadings and Drehner has other-
wise manifested a defiant attitude toward the Rules of Supreme Court of
Indiana and the Rules of the Allen Superior Court No. 3; that on one occa-
sion the Allen Superior Court No. 3 entered a default judgment against
Drehner because of Drehner's obdurate refusal to plead, removing same from
the docket sheet prior to the time it was typed into the order book only be-
cause Drehner was immediately advised of such entry and filed a pleading
before the persons in charge of the order book had an opportunity to type
the entry into the order book; Drehner is continuing its policy of delay and
there is no reason to expect any change until the ultimate disposition of
the litigation; and
WHEREAS, Delbert Otis and Regina Otis realize that any judgment in
their favor would not have to be satisfied until the ultimate disposition of
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citing language from a leading authority on legal ethics."'
A lawyer may not, in order to get decided a question of
law in which he is interested, foist a fictitious contro-
versy on the court .... He may not ostensibly appear for
a stooge client when he represents another. 2
the litigation; their investigation to date indicated that NIPSCO is correct in
that its part is secondary, that Drehner is promarily responsible for the afore-
said explosion and that Drehner is primarily liable in each of the aforesaid
actions; and
WHEREAS, Drehner is one of the largest general contractors in the area
and is financially able to pay substantially more than the prayer in the Otis
Complaints, without financially impairing Drehner; and
WHEREAS, Otis and NIPSCO are desirous of reaching an agreement
which would enable Delbert Otis and Regina Otis to receive monies at the
present time without jeopardizing the claims against Dehner alleged in the
aforesaid actions and which agreement would limit NIPSCO's ultimate lia-
bility without affecting its rights to indemnity from Drehner;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises, and in consid-
eration of the promises hereinafter expressed, it is agreed by and between
Delbert Otis and Regina Otis on the one hand and NIPSCO on the other that:
1. Contemporaneously with the execution of this instrument NIPSCO will
advance to Delbert Otis and Regina Otis jointly the sum of $50,000.00 as
a loan, without interest, payable only in the event and to the extent that
Delbert Otis and Regina Otis, or either of them, receives a recovery (over
and above the costs of litigation, including by way of illustration and
not of limitation, court costs and experts' and physicians' fees for con-
sultation and appearance at trial, but not including attorneys' fees),
from Drehner by reason of the above described injuries and damages.
2. Delbert Otis and Regina Otis agree they will pursue the aforesaid actions
diligently; that, in the event judgment is awarded against both defen-
dants and either or both of said actions, they will not cause any execution
to issue against NIPSCO by reason of such judgment. In the event either
or both of said actions results in a judgment against NIPSCO alone, the
plaintiff in such action may levy execution against NIPSCO but only for
the sum by which such judgment exceeds $50,000.00.
3. Delbert Otis and Regina Otis further agree that they will not initiate
suit against NIPSCO or in any manner demand, claim, accept or receive
any monies from NIPSCO by reason of the aforesaid explosion and the
resulting injuries and damages other than as hereinabove provided.
It is understood and agreed by and between the parties that this
agreement does not effect a release of the claims of Delbert Otis and/or
Regina Otis against NIPSCO, and it is further understood and agreed
that the parties do not intend to, nor do they relinquish their respective
claims against Drehner, but each of the aforesaid actions shall be prose-
cuted diligently, as hereinabove stated, and NIPSCO shall take whatever
steps it deems necessary to protect and assert its rights to indemnity
against Drehner and actively contest any liability.
71. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953).
72. Id. at 75.
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The Lum court held that although the preceding language is not
exactly parallel, the underlying idea is applicable." To retain the
agreeing codefendants as parties, as adverse witnesses, and as a
device to encourage large jury verdicts is to foist a fiction before
the court prejudicial to the nonagreeing codefendant, prejudicial
to the integrity of the court, and prejudicial to the fair adminis-
tration of justice.
2. Contra to Public Policy on Grounds Other than Ethical
Violations
First, loan receipt agreements in the plaintiff-codefendant
context are violative of public policy where joint tortfeasors dif-
fer in the degree of blame they bear for an injury. The device
tends to shift the entire burden of loss to the less blameworthy
tortfeasor, since his cotortfeasor will be willing to offer more to
the injured party under such an agreement in an effort to mini-
mize his greater exposure or to escape liability altogether. 4
Second, although courts have often noted that codefendants
do not always cooperate in an effort to defeat the plaintiff,"5 the
adversary nature of the proceeding is severely undermined by the
collusive nature of the agreement and the monetary incentive to
commit perjury. It is one thing to try to place blame on the other
party, but it is a totally different matter when a collusive agree-
ment with a monetary reward for a favorable outcome to the
plaintiff insures the defendant's cooperation with the plaintiff.
The policy of full development and presentation of facts in an ad-
versary context is virtually stifled.
At least one case has suggested that the device simplifies
multi-party litigation while at the same time facilitating private
settlement.7 6 Nothing could be further from the truth. In the
plaintiff-codefendant context, the agreeing tortfeasor remains as
a defendant so the same number of parties still exists. No sim-
plification is present. In the plaintiff-codefendant context, it is
true that one party enters into a private agreement. Although
this may settle his claim, the effect of the so-called loan is to en-
courage the plaintiff to pursue the remaining codefendant, appeal
73. 488 P.2d at 352.
74. Reese v. Chicago, B.&Q. R.R., 55 I1. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d a82(1973) (Judges Schaefer, Ward and Ryan dissenting).
75. See NIPSCO v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 250 N.E.2d 378 (1969).
76. Reese v. Chicago, B.&Q. R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382(1973).
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after appeal, until the final pound of flesh is extracted."" The
non-agreeing codefendant is barred from settling out of court by
the very nature and contractual provisions of the loan receipt de-
vice. In short, the loan receipt device in the plaintiff-codefendant
context is contra to public policy on the ground that it prevents
complete settlement of suits, thereby increasing costs of litigation
and impairing the efficient administration of justice.
3. Circumvention of Rule Prohibiting Contribution
or Indemnity Between Cotortfeasors
In the United States, the overwhelming majority of courts"'
refuse to allow contribution."' Since the injured party's success
in an action against a cotortfeasor makes it possible for the loan-
ing tortfeasor to recoup all or a portion of the funds advanced,
at the expense of the non-agreeing codefendant, the loan receipt
agreement can properly be characterized as a device enabling one
joint tortfeasor to obtain indemnity or contribution from another."
Because this fiction circumvents the rule prohibiting contribution,
several courts have pierced the fiction and denied the validity of
a loan."
4. Circumvention of Real Party In Interest Statute
Pursuant to Trial Rule 17, every action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest. The fiction of a loan
77. 303 N.E.2d at 387-88.
78. See Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Iowa 1953); Jackson
v. Record, 211 Ind. 141, 5 N.E.2d 897 (1937); American Exp. Co. v. Patterson,
73 Ind. 430 (1881); Silvers v. Nerdlinger, 30 Ind. 53 (1868); Hunt v. Lape,
9 Ind. 248 (1857); Smith v. Graves, 59 Ind. App. 55, 108 N.E. 168 (1915);
Cullen v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry., 211 Kan. 368, 507 P.2d 353 (1973);
Tober v. Hampton, 178 Neb. 858, 136 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
79. The reason underlying the prohibition against contribution or in-
demnity is that courts should not be used for the relief of wrongdoers. Noting
this rationale, the Illinois Supreme Court in Reese v. Chicago, B.&O. R.R.,
55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973), held that the courts are not involved
in private, out-of-court loan receipt agreements. Reese is clearly in the mi-
nority in this view. See note 81 infra. Not only are both parties to the agree-
ment still involved in the litigation, but the direct effect of the fiction is to
secure for the agreeing codefendant a portion of the plaintiff's recovery to
which he would not otherwise be entitled.
80. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 1111, 1115 (1973).
81. Alder v. Garcia, 324 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1963) (applying New Mex-
ico law); Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Iowa 1953); Cullen v.
Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry., 211 Kan. 368, 507 P.2d 353 (1973); Herring v.
Jackson, 255 N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961) ; Tober v. Hampton, 178 Neb.
858, 136 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
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agreement obscures the fact that only the agreeing codefendant
has a substantial interest in the outcome of the case. For all prac-
tical purposes, the plaintiff is reimbursed for his loss. The out-
come of the case will neither diminish nor increase his recovery.
The net effect of the fiction is to allow the agreeing codefendant
to circumvent the real party in interest statute.
One case so holding was Tober v. Hampton,82 an action
brought by a landlord and tenant against a construction company
which allegedly ruptured a gas line while digging a ditch. The
result was an explosion and consequential injuries to the plain-
tiff. The gas company which owned the line, being potentially
liable as joint tortfeasor for having failed to detect the source of
the leak during an investigation, advanced money to the plaintiff
under so-called loan receipts giving the company irrevocable con-
trol over the prosecution. The Nebraska Supreme Court in Tober
noted that absent a statute to the contrary, an assignee of a chose
in action is generally considered to be the real party in interest
within a real-party-in-interest statute. 3 Consistent with this prin-
ciple, the Tober court pierced the loan receipt fiction holding such
devices between a plaintiff and a joint tortfeasor to be an assign-
ment of the claim against the remaining codefendant. No valid
loan was found. As a result, an action brought by the injured
party against the non-agreeing cotortfeasor was subject to dis-
missal upon the ground that it was not being prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest."
82. 17 Neb. 858, 136 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
83. Id. at 207. Accord, 59 AM. JuR. 2d Parties § 41 (1971).
84. Plaintiff in a plaintiff-codefendant context should not be allowed
to rely on any exception to the real party in interest statute. Indiana Trial
Rule 17(a) (1) allows a trustee of an express trust to sue without joining
with him the person for whose benefit the action is prosecuted. However,
the parties to a loan receipt device ordinarily do not expressly label their
transaction a trust. Nor does it normally appear that the parties intended
the device to be a trust. Accordingly, to first label this device a loan then
to label it a trust is to play word games, fictions being created at the whim
and for the sole benefit of the agreeing tortfeasor and to the circumvention
of the real party in interest statute. Indiana courts have repeatedly stated
the test for a real party in interest to be one with an actual, not fictional,
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, that is, the owner
of the claims sued on or the one who ultimately is entitled to the fruits of
the action. Davis v. King, 108 Ind. 387, 103 N.E. 98 (1913); John A. Boyd
Motor Co. v. Claffey, 94 Ind. App. 492, 165 N.E. 255 (1929).
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5. Circumvention of Rule Barring Assignment of Tort Claims
As a general rule, it is unlawful to assign a tort claim. The
use of the loan receipt fiction seriously undermines that long-
standing doctrine. By the fiction, one of two joint tortfeasors is
permitted to buy from the injured person or his administrator
the cause ol' action as it relates to him, and then to participate in
the assertion of the cause of action against his codefendants."
6. Circumvention of the Rule Barring Champerty
Blackstone defined champerty as a situation where "the cham-
pertor is to carry on the party's suit at his own expense."8 Indi-
ana follows this common law definition on the ground that cham-
perty is a perversion of justice, encourages misuse of the courts,
and unfairly harasses defendants."' In spite of this tradition, the
issue of champerty in the loan receipt context has never been
raised in Indiana. 8 The court in Klukas v. Yount,"' refused to
85. 303 N.E.2d at 387.
86. 14 AM. JuR. 2d Champerty and Maintenance § 9 (1971).
87. Draper v. Zebec, 219 Ind. 362, 37 N.E.2d 952 (1941), rehearing de-
nied, 219 Ind. 362, 38 N.E.2d 995; Hotmire v. O'Brien, 44 Ind. App. 694, 90
N.E. 33 (1909) (the aiding of a litigant by a stranger otherwise having no
interest in the litigant's claim whereby the stranger is to receive a part of
the thing in dispute).
88. One technical problem for one challenging loan receipt devices on
grounds of champerty is that only a party to a champertous contract may
raise the defense of champerty. Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 172 (1882) (involv-
ing champerty where A advanced money to enable B to prosecute a civil suit
for assault and battery). Accord, Zeigler v. Mize, 132 Ind. 403, 31 N.E. 945
(1892); Campbell v. Bd. of Commissioners of Boone County, 41 Ind. App.
710, 83 N.E. 357 (1908). Nonetheless, some courts denying standing to a
person not a party to the contract have taken note of the violation and re-
fused to enforce it under the inherent power of courts to preserve their own
integrity and maintain public policy. See note 65 supra.
Another technical problem for one challenging loan receipt devices is an
exception to the traditional bar to champerty: it is not champertous to ad-
vance money to finance an action by a poor person. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1423 (1962). Although no Indiana case has considered this view,
Corbin's exception is consistent with one of the ideas underlying the need for
the fiction. That is, the plaintiff is in need of immediate funds both to prose-
cute the claim and to meet the necessities of life. But it is crucial to note that,
by statute, this exception seems to be abrogated. IND. CODE § 34-1-60-4 (1971)
stipulates that an attorney has a duty not to encourage the commencement
or the continuance of an action or proceeding for any motive of passion or
interest. The language of the statute is all inclusive. There is no evidence
of legislative intent to create an exception to the bar against champertous
suits. In the plaintiff-codefendant context, the device is champertous not only
because of a division of proceeds between the plaintiff and a stranger to
the plaintiff's interests but also because the device limits the non-agreeing
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rule upon the contention that a loan receipt device was cham-
pertous on the ground that the issue was not raised at the trial.
Other courts," however, have considered the issue, holding the
use of a fiction would not be allowed to circumvent the state's
rule barring champerty.
For instance, the Nevada Supreme Court has considered the
issue of champerty in the plaintiff-cotortfeasor context." In es-
sence, the Nevada Supreme Court held that maintaining the suit
of another is unlawful unless the maintaining person has some
interest in the subject of the suit or is connected with such other
person by ties of consanguinity or affinity.
If insurance companies may contend that. . . they have
so little relationship to actions against their insureds that
the policies they issue are not discoverable even by vitally
concerned plaintiffs . . . then surely no one will contend
a carrier has such relationship to a plaintiff's action as
justifies fostering it, for profit, against defendants with
whom the carrier and its insureds have no relationship
whatever. 2
Thus, agreements whereby a cotortfeasor's insurance carrier
agrees to pay the plaintiff any consideration to foster litigation
in which it is not interested, in order to avoid its own liabilities,
are contrary to public policy and law.
Expansion of loan receipt devices into the plaintiff-codefen-
dant context opens a Pandora's box to the courts. Among the evils
exposed to the courts are ethical violations on the part of partici-
pating attorneys and the undermining of several well established
legal principles, such as the rules prohibiting contribution or in-
demnity between cotortfeasors, concerning real party in interest,
barring assignment of tort claims, and barring champerty. Fur-
thermore, the general analysis that the devices are contrary to
public policy militates against their expansion into a factual set-
ting which is inherently prejudicial to courts.
defendant's right to compromise with the plaintiff. This is clearly violative
of IND. CODE § 34-1-60-4 (1971). See also City of Rochester v. Campbell, 184
Ind. 421, 111 N.E. 420 (1916) (either unlawful division of proceeds or impair-
ment of right to compromise with non-agreeing party constituted champerty).
89. 121 Ind. App. 160, 98 N.E.2d 227 (1951).
90. 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347, 350 (1971). See note 65 supra and ac-
companying text.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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B. Prejudice to Non-agreeing Codefendant
In addition to the enumerated areas of possible prejudice to
courts, expansion of the loan receipt device prejudices non-agree-
ing codefendants. Examination of jury selection reveals at least
one area of possible prejudice to the non-agreeing codefendant.
Pursuant to Indiana statute"' each side gets six peremptory chal-
lenges. There is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges;
these are statutory entitlements. 4 Within its inherent power to
regulate courtroom procedure, a court may exercise discretion
in directing the number of peremptory challenges given to the
parties on each side so long as the statutory right to challenge is
not completely taken away." Although courts have the discretion
to apportion peremptory challenges according to the interest, a
danger still exists. The agreeing tortfeasor who continues to sit
at the defendants' table before the jury, in spite of the fact that
his only interest is that the plaintiff extract substantial recovery
from the non-agreeing codefendant, may be allowed to split the
six peremptory challenges with the non-agreeing codefendant. In
effect, the plaintiff is getting nine peremptory challenges-the
six normally given to each side plus the three which the agreeing
tortfeasor will exercise in plaintiff's favor. Thus, plaintiff gets
three more peremptory challenges than his statutory entitlement.
This effect has the inherent tendency to be prejudicial to a non-
agreeing codefendant. 6
93. IND. CODE § 34-1-20-7 (1971).
94. Jacoby v. State, 212 Ind. 465, 8 N.E.2d 978 (1937) (criminal trial).
95. Veach v. McDowell, 133 Ind. App. 628, 184 N.E.2d 149 (1962).
96. As a general rule, a case will not be reversed because error is com-
mitted by the court in a ruling on a peremptory challenge where no harm
results to the objecting party from such ruling. 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error
§ 1708 (1964). It is important to remember that demonstrating prejudice may
be difficult. Ordinarily there is no presumption that errors or irregularities
in the selection or impaneling of the jury were prejudicial and the burden is
on appellant to show prejudice. 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1677 (1964).
Accordingly, the fact that a party is allowed more or less than the legal
number of peremptory challenges is not cause for reversal of the case in the
absence of prejudice to the complaining party. On the other hand, if the
complaining party is prejudiced by an erroneous ruling on peremptory chal-
lenges, the error is not harmless. Accordingly, Indiana courts have held it
to be ground for reversal to totally deprive a party of his legal number of
peremptory challenges or to allow one of the parties additional peremptory
challenges. Veach v. McDowell, 133 Ind. App. 628, 184 N.E.2d 149 (1962)
(finding abuse of discretion to allow plaintiff to exercise two of its three
allotted challenges, depriving him of the exercise of the last one, where the
defendant subsequently accepted the jury as selected). Thus, in the plaintiff-
codefendant context, the chance for prejudice to the non-agreeing defendant
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CONCLUSION
It is absolutely crucial to understand the proper nature of a
fiction. A fiction is an equitable device designed to achieve equi-
table results. Where even one party is prejudiced or the mere
possibility of adverse consequences is present, the fiction should
be dissolved or denied extension into areas not originally com-
prehended by the fiction. 7 A loan receipt agreement is a fiction.
It originated and was properly employed in a very specific his-
torical context involving an insurer and its insured shipper. In
this narrow factual setting, there were several legitimate needs
for the fiction. Accordingly, some courts expressly recognized the
so-called loan agreement as a fiction. Other less candid decisions,
however, paid lip service to the idea that the true test for a valid
loan was the parties' intention. Notably, the circumstances in these
decisions do not indicate that the parties mutually intended to
create a loan. Most tellingly, the bulk of these decisions is de-
voted to equitable justifications for the use of a fiction, not the
straight forward test for a valid loan.
Given the equitable nature of fictions and the specific fact
that loan receipts are fictional, any case extending the use of this
fiction into the plaintiff-codefendant context is distinguishable on
three main grounds: (1) factually, the needs which originally
gave rise to the fiction are not present in the new context; (2) the
law applied to the procedural issues in the original context has
been overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins; (3) several negative
effects result in the application of the loan receipt fiction in the
new context. Thus the loan receipt fiction should be dissolved or
denied extension into the plaintiff-codefendant area. 8
is great if the effect of giving the plaintiff nine peremptory challenges is
not per se prejudicial.
97. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189 (1919); United States v. 1960 Bags
of Coffee, 3 U.S. (8 Cranch) 188, 198 (1814) ("It seems to be a rule founded
in common sense, as well as strict justice, that 'fictions of law' shall not be
permitted to work any wrong, but shall be used ut res m ngis valeat quam
pereat."); Purdy v. McGarity, 30 N.Y.S.2d 966, 262 A. 623 (1941); Parker
Peanut Co. v. Felder, 200 S.C. 203, 20 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1942) ("Fictions are
invented and instituted for the promotion of justice. It is a certain rule that
a fiction of law shall never be contradicted so as to defeat the end for which
it was invented, but for every other purpose it may be contradicted."). Cf. 95
U. PA. L. REV. 231, 234 (1946) ("the use of a legal device, proper in its
setting should not be extended to a situation foreign to its nature for the
purpose of thwarting the decisions of the courts").
98. The following is a list of cases which must be distinguished in order
to defeat the use of loan receipts in the plaintiff-codefendant context. The
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format is designed for the practicing attorney and includes every Indiana
case subsequent to Luckenbach which has considered validity of the loan re-
ceipt fiction.
Klukas v. Yount, 121 Ind. App. 160, 98 N.E.2d 227 (1951), was the first
Indiana case to consider the use of loan receipts in the plaintiff-cotortfeasor
context. (1) The decision was poorly reasoned, omitting any analysis of the
historical setting in which the fiction originated or reason for its confine-
ment to the insurer-insured shipper context. (2) Reliance on Luckenbach on
the procedural issue of real party in interest was both misplaced and indica-
tive of the lack of reasoning given to the decision. Consequently, there is no
definitive holding in Indiana on the real party in interest issue. (3) The
assumption underlying Klukas is that a fiction valid for one purpose is valid
for all purposes. Disappointingly, the following contentions were never raised
in this Indiana case which has become a mainstay for validating the fiction
in Indiana: fiction, circumvention of contribution, circumvention of indem-
nity, circumvention of assignment of personal injury claim, champerty, ethics
violations, and public policy. The total lack of analysis should diminish or
extinguish Kluka8 as authority for the validity of loan receipts in the plain-
tiff-codefendant context.
NIPSCO v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, 250 N.E.2d 378 (1969), upheld the
validity of loan receipt devices in the plaintiff-cotortfeasor context although
the decision could have been decided on a narrower ground. (1) The main
issue before the court was whether a separate trial should have been granted.
The court admitted that its decision could have been based on either of two
grounds: that the granting of motion for separate trial was within the
sound discretion of the trial judge, or that the moving codefendant failed
to cite a single case in support of his motion for a separate trial. Id. at 390.
Thus, it can be argued that Otis is precedent only for the proposition that a
motion for a new trial must be accompanied by supportive cases or that trial
judges have wide discretion in this area. The language discussing the validity
of loan agreements is mere dicta, not essential to reaching the decision. (2) Al-
ternatively, if Otis is considered valid authority for the use of loan receipts
in Indiana, then it can be attacked because of its primary reliance on Klukas
and Luckenbach. Otis was only the second Indiana case to discuss the use of
loan receipt devices in the plaintiff-codefendant context and yet it shirked its
duty to examine the historical underpinnings of the device, to examine the
needs which originally gave rise to the fiction, and to examine the inequitable
results of extending the device into unintended areas. Actually, the lack of
historical analysis is not surprising since the issue of the validity of loan
agreements was not properly before the court. In fact, a motion for separate
trial would assume the validity of such agreements. Thus, in spite of the fact
that the court notes "cross contentions" about the validity of the device, the
parties were in agreement that such device was valid. Id. (3) The court sum-
marily dismissed the idea that the policy against contribution or indemnity
was traversed. Likewise, the prohibition against assignment of court claims
was summarily dismissed in the same sentence. The court's only authority
for such cursory examination was A.L.R. cites which referred to loan re-
ceipts arising in the insurer-insured context, not the plaintiff-codefendant
context which was before the court. Id. at 393, citing 1 A.L.R. 1528 (1919),
132 A.L.R. 607 (1941), and 157 A.L.R. 1261 (1945). (4) Ethics and the real
party in interest issues simply were not discussed.
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American Transport Co. v. Central Indiana Ry., 255 Ind. 319, 264 N.E.2d
64 (1970), involved the issue whether plaintiff-administrator after entering
an agreement designated "covenant not to execute" with a codefendant was
barred from executing against the non-agreeing defendant on the ground
that the agreement was a partial payment of partial satisfaction. The Madi-
son Superior Court restrained execution but the Indiana Supreme Court,
speaking through Judge Givan, reversed. The court looked behind the label,
finding a loan agreement, which it upheld under the validity of Klukae and
Otis. Thus the issue of the validity was not squarely before the Supreme
Court of Indiana. Consequently, the parties to the action may have not
briefed the relevant issues concerning validity. This could account for the
blind adherence to prior lower court results without examining the applica-
bility thereof or the depth of the lower court reasoning. Again the distinc-
tion between the original insurer-insured shipper context and the plaintiff-
codedefendant context was not analyzed. The court at one point stated that
the non-agreeing codefendant would not be prejudiced because the plaintiff
could have executed against either codefendant he chose. Id. at 67. Such a
facile argument takes little note of the aforementioned dangers to the in-
tegrity of the court and prejudice to the non-agreeing codefendant, not the
least of which is the inducement to commit perjury.
Scott v. Krueger, 151 Ind. App. 479, 280 N.E.2d 336 (1972), involved the
issue whether an agreement between the plaintiff and one codefendant, con-
stituting covenant not to sue, entered into while the jury was deliberating,
was proper matter to submit to the jury. (1) Since the case did not involve
a loan receipt device, it is not relevant to the validity of the device. Lan-
guage to the effect that such devices are valid is mere dicta. (2) Even the
dicta is erroneous in that it is based on Otis and Klukas, two decisions suffer-
ing from lack of analysis.
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